COMMENTARY
The PUC's Electricity Deregulation Proposals:
Point/Counterpoint
INTRODUCTION
by Robert C. Fellmeth
n April 24, 1994, the California
UPublic Utilities Commission (PUC)
issued its Order Instituting Inves.
tigation and Rulemaking to restructure the
electricity industry. The order represented
the culmination of two years of study, and
was based on three underlying judgments:
- "Command-and-control" and "costof-service" regulation and "central planning" have become obsolete in an "increasingly competitive electric services market."
- California's private power utilities
charge some of the highest rates in the
nation.
- The Commission has (successfully)
used enhanced competition in other areas
of regulation, including telecommunications.
The PUC's initial order also criticized
the disincentive to new investment caused
by cost-of-service regulation, the "burdensome administrative proceedings" (of the
PUC), and "unnecessary" barriers to public participation in its proceedings.
Electricity utilities have long been
considered "natural monopolies" requiring maximum rate regulation. The high
threshold costs necessary to create a utility meant that there was room for only one
entrepreneur to operate efficiently. Because
a single (monopoly) enterprise was inevitable, government regulation to preclude
excessive prices and other abuses of monopoly power was compelled. But as U.S.
District Judge Harold Greenes decision
in the AT&T telecommunications case
indicated, it may be possible to take that
portion of a utility enterprise where "there
is room for only one" and confine the
utility to it, leaving the remainder of the
enterprise subject to competition. In telecommunications, this was accomplished
by narrowing the highly regulated utility
to the wire and switches constituting the
"loop" which gets the phone signal to a
home, and allowing competition in the
transmission of signals by microwave
where there is room for many competitors.

In electricity, the same principle may
apply where one confines close regulation
to the network bringing in the power, but
allows competition in power generation
-where many competitors may flourish.
Hence, utility deregulation involves allowing many separate companies to generate electricity and contribute it to the
"grid"-or system of transmission wires.
This "grid" remains a monopoly which
distributes (or "wheels") this power to
customers for a fair charge.
The transformation of utilities from
regulated to partially competitive raises
the following common concerns: (1) prior
regulation has often cross-subsidized
some groups (the elderly or poor), which
may not be as achievable with wider
competition; (2) regulators are currently
able to accommodate "external costs" (for
example, encouraging energy conservation to extend nonrenewable resources
for societal gain), which may also not be
achievable easily with deregulation; (3)
some customers are inherently organized
and possess strong bargaining power visa-vis others (for example, industrial vs.
residential users); (4) where the remaining utility enterprise is allowed to participate in the new competitive sector, it
will use its remaining monopoly power
to unfair advantage; and (5) the competitive sector is often subject to standard
antitrust offenses which are not monitored or prosecuted because of the presence
of a regulator committed to "non-interference."
Notwithstanding commonly cited concers, neither utilities nor consumers have
categorically opposed deregulation. Each
of the five problems listed above is addressable through legislation or through
the details of remaining regulation. However, where historical monopoly power
has been subject to deregulation (as in air
transportation, telecommunications, and
cable television), serious abuses have occurred-for example, failure to apply antitrust law (air transport), refusal to limit
monopoly power participation and distortion of the new competitive sector (telecommunications), and statutory inability to
control egregious practices by the monopoly enterprise (cable television). Accord-
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ingly, the details of deregulation determine whether enhanced efficiencies will
occur, and whether new abuses will evolve
from a pendulum-swing overreliance on
the "market" without antitrust or fair competition oversight where still needed.
The basic structure of the Commission's proposal is consistent with a trend
to separate power generation from transmission. Part of that trend was reflected
in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct). The PURPA
statute allows for contribution to the grid
by power generators, and their required
compensation by utilities. The EPAct severed the automatic control of utilities over
the power transmitted by their networks; it
authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to require utilities to
"provide wholesale transmission service."
And in 1991, FERC approved the "Westem Systems Power Pool" established by
utilities to facilitate sale or trade of power
between them.
Electricity deregulation-as originally
proposed by the PUC in April 1994would allow power consumers to contract
directly with power generators. The original concept was to allow consumer choice
to either remain with the existing utility,
or to make alternative arrangements with
power generators or with "brokers" for
such generators. This plan anticipated
"retail wheeling," where large industrial
users, then commercial consumers, and
finally households (in separate stages)
would be permitted to contract directly
with power producers, and the utilities
would simply collect a fee for use of the
grid to transmit the power to the user.
Consumers could choose to remain users
of the utility's own power generation,
and would be subject to PUC rate review
protection.
The PUC also proposed to initiate another policy called "performance-based
ratesetting," which could be implemented
together with or separately from retail
wheeling. Here, the utility's maximum
price would be set based on the average
price of electricity. To the extent the utility is able to produce (or purchase from
others) cheaper electricity and beat the
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average price, the savings are divided between ratepayers and stockholders. If the
utility becomes less efficient, the losses
would also be split between ratepayers
and stockholders.
The difficulty for utilities under both
of these proposals is the fate of existing
and inefficient powerplants. The utilities
seek a return on existing and sunk investment, which gives them a bias to use
costly power generation where they can
pass those higher costs on to consumers.
Retail wheeling and performance-based
ratemaking are each intended to provide
a market incentive to generate or find electricity generation more cheaply. Thus, the
PUC's initial proposal won the backing
of some utilities by requiring ratepayers
to pay for much of the costs of retiring
uneconomic generators.
The initial reaction to the PUC's original proposal included objections and concems, and generated the following questions:
- Will the phase-in of industrial, then
commercial, and then residential customers lead to industrial "skimming of the
cream" of the best and cheapest power,
with residential users getting what's left?
What will be left for residential userswho have little ability to bargain among
providers-except high-cost power from
inefficient, outmoded plants?
- What will happen in the proposed
system to needed cross-subsidies which
assist low-income ratepayers in securing
basic services?
- What will happen to the state's interest in long-run consequences as reflected in policies stimulating conservation,
power from renewable sources, and pollution control? Utilities are currently required to obtain a percentage of their power from environmentally sound sources;
will that societal interest be sacrificed for
immediate energy gratification? What
would happen to fledgling biomass generation (the burning of discarded plant
material-the largest source of landfill
trash) for electricity?
Since April 1994, the Commission has
been holding hearings throughout the state
on its proposal, and fencing with both
FERC and the state legislature about its
jurisdictional prerogatives.
Consumer groups, including two of
the state's leading representatives of utility consumers-Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) and Utility Consumers' Action Network (UCAN), have been
particularly critical of the details of the
Commission's electricity deregulation
plan. TURN presented an alternative plan,
termed "Community Access to Competitive Energy," to the Commission in Sep-

tember 1994; TURN's plan included the
following elements: (I) cities, counties,
and other local authorities would be authorized to set up "consumer-owned utilities" to purchase power transmission and
distribution services from utilities at regulated prices (choosing their own sources of
power); (2) rates for participating subscribers would be set by the authority, as would
any cross-subsidies for conservation and
nonrenewable resources; and (3) utilities
would be phased out entirely as producers
of power and confined to transmission.
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) embraced the PUC's initial plan in its broad
outline. Southern California Edison, however, bitterly opposed it and-together
with San Diego Gas & Electric Company-proposed an alternative now dubbed "PoolCo." Under the utilities' alternative, the Commission would create a
statewide "wholesale pool" of power by
1997, and at the same time implement
its "performance-based ratemaking" proposal. The energy combine would be accessible only by industrial users for two
years, after which households would
have the chance to participate. The concept is to create a private, independent
vehicle for the marketing of power separate from utility carriers.
Following six days of PUC full-panel
hearings and its review of comments submitted by 140 parties and hundreds of individuals in 16 public participation hearings over the past year, a three-member
majority of the Commission now favors
the "PoolCo" alternative. On May 24, 1995,
the PUC released for public comment two
alternative proposals-the original plan
(now sponsored by Commissioner Jessie J.
Knight, Jr.) and "PoolCo" (favored by
PUC President Daniel Wm. Fessler and
Commissioners P. Gregory Conlon and
Henry Duque).
We present below a defense and critique, respectively, of the new "PoolCo"
conceptual plan now being advanced by
the Commission. The defense of "PoolCo"
is authored by Jim Conran, with a background as a utility executive (with Pacific Bell), public official (director of the
California Department of Consumer Affairs), candidate for Insurance Commissioner, and now president of Orinda-based
Consumers First, a coalition of California ratepayers. The critique is written by
Audrie Krause, until recently the executive director of TURN.

POINT:
Consumers Should Be
Turned On By "PoolCo"
by Jim Conran
alifornians may not be aware of
what is happening in San Francisco, but-if all goes according to
plan-electricity consumers in the state
soon will benefit by an innovative policy
proposed in May by the California Public
Utilities Commission (PUC). The proposal, which would allow consumers to
purchase electricity from a provider other
than the utility currently monopolizing the
area, reflects two recent trends in current
public policymaking-facilitating an orderly transition from monopolies to a
competitive marketplace, and representing the interests of all consumers over the
concerns of large, special-interest parties.
Through the creation of a power pool
which would dispense the lowest-cost
power first, the PUC will establish a competitive market within the electric utility
industry which will result in lower electricity rates for consumers. The current PUC
proposal thus meets the two primary goals
established initially by the PUC-lower
electricity rates and a choice of electricity
suppliers for consumers. Under the plan,
California private utilities such as Pacific
Gas & Electric, San Diego Gas & Electric,
and Southern California Edison would be
forced to compete against each other for
the opportunity to deliver the lowest price
to the pool. Then, they will have the right
to directly serve, via the pool, consumers
throughout the state.
In business, it is a generally agreedupon principle that competition encourages lower prices; therefore, the PUC
plan will result in lower electricity prices
for all California consumers. However,
this proposal is beneficial to consumers
because of how they will benefit and because of how detrimental the other alternatives would be. Under the present scenario of providing electrical power to consumers, Californians are restricted to a
designated electrical provider based upon
their residence/business being located
within a utility's territory. This situation
is not in the consumers' best interests because there is only one electrical provider
in each territory; thus, there are no factors which could influence competitive
pricing.
Also, the current arrangement allows
for big businesses and large-volume consumers to benefit at the cost of the residential consumers. Consumers, albeit often
without knowing it, pay higher basic rates
in order to compensate the utility for ac-
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commodating the need of bigger customers through special discounts, incentives,
and pricing packages. In terms of customer service, the residential consumers
obviously suffer since the prompt attention afforded big-volume users does not
trickle down to the average electricity
customer. This unfair situation is remedied by the PUC's "pool" approach which
ensures that the utility providing electricity to the pool already is offering the lowest competitive rates.
Another alternative floated by some
proponents of deregulation is one of "retail wheeling." This plan would allow utilities to compete for customers throughout the state without regulations protecting the interests of the consumers. This
idea practically would defeat the whole
purpose of deregulation since average
consumers-already suffering under the
current system-would enter the marketplace at an immediate disadvantage; their
consumption patterns and electricity needs
still would not attract the attention of the
big, independent suppliers of electricity,
and thus consumers would have no means
to solicit competitive bids for service.
Again, the pool proposal pending before
the PUC addresses this disparity since
the very nature of the pool guarantees
that average consumers' collective energy needs will warrant competitive pricing from the utilities.
In general, deregulation is good for
encouraging competition within a marketplace. But with a commodity such as
a public utility, complete and open competition cannot exist in the name of public policy. There must be some remaining
elements of government control and regulation in place to ensure that the rights
of citizens are not being violated. The
PUC has masterfully compromised alternatives without compromising principles
in its-current electricity deregulation proposal. By implementing the pool concept, the state would introduce a competitive free market system to the electricity industry, while maintaining some
control over the delivery of the actual
electricity and services. If only the federal government had addressed deregulation of the cable and telephone industries as well as the PUC is handling the
electricity issue, perhaps our cable and
phone rates would be lower too.
The PUC's approach also will assist
in the stabilizing of the electric utility industry. For example, one of the major
problems associated with the changes
witnessed in the airline industry was the
reduction of 22 major carriers in the nation to a total of approximately eight.
The PUC's proposal offers an opportu-

nity for smaller, more rural electric and
municipal utilities in the state to grow
their grids and volume, as well as to expand their customer base. Heretofore
these utilities have been prohibited, both
legally and structurally, from entering
the territory of another electric utility.
Once all electricity providers in the state
have access to all of California's consumers, the corresponding customer bases of
the respective utilities should reach more
balanced levels. This result only could
strengthen competition, and thus benefit
consumers.
Perhaps the most reassuring development from the introduction of this proposal is the sign from the PUC that it is
committed to being progressive, forwardthinking, and objective. By converting the
electric industry from the current anti-consumer relationship to that reflecting more
of a free market approach toward a utility
industry that has been regulated heavily for
over 100 years, the PUC will continue to
guard the public's safety and oversee our
electric service. It is appropriate that, as
we enter the 21st century, the Commission's latest plan to deregulate offers the
hope to residential customers originally
intended by regulation of the electric utility industry.
Fortunately for California consumers,
there are public officials who act responsibly, recognizing the concerns of the average citizen. All consumers currently disenfranchised by the existing regulatory
framework should take heart in the anticipation that change-for the better-is
near. The PUC wisely has proposed a plan
for providing electricity fairly, a plan
whose ramifications and shock waves
could carry beyond California's state
lines. As Californians and consumers, we
should be charged up for this momentous
undertaking, and we must ensure that the
PUC does not waver in its proposed decision.

California Regulatory Law Reporter • Vol. 15, Nos. 2&3 (Spring/Summer 1995)

COUNTERPOINT:
Consumers Will Lose
With "PoolCo"
by Audrie Krause
idyou ever stop to wonder why all
the major airlines seem to offer
virtually identical prices, despite
all the hype about deregulation creating a
more competitive market? Or why the airlines play "follow the leader" when it
comes to raising prices?
There are two dirty words for this practice: It's called "price-fixing." In fact,
several major airlines recently paid out
a hefty $458 million settlement on a
class action lawsuit alleging that the airlines fixed prices by signaling proposed
fare changes to each other via the computer reservation system.
California consumers of electricity could
be facing a similar scenario if the state
Public Utilities Commission's "PoolCo"
proposal becomes the model for electric
deregulation in the state.
Proponents such as Southern California Edison claim PoolCo would create
lower electricity prices through competition. Under the PoolCo model, investorowned utility giants like SoCal Edison,
Pacific Gas & Electric, and San Diego
Gas & Electric would vie with independent power producers by bidding into a
"pool" administered by a supposedly neutral agency. That's like setting up a contest
between a pit bull and a Chihuahua: We
know from the start who is going to win.
PoolCo backers spin a tale of a highly
competitive energy marketplace, with
bidders shaving their prices close to their
costs and consumers reaping the benefits. But this rosy view is far from the
reality the PUC's PoolCo model would
create. Instead, the PoolCo would allow
the biggest players-utilities and a handful of well-financed independents-to
maximize their profits and market share
through price-fixing, a la the airlines.
Meanwhile, consumers would be denied
the benefits of true competition.
Here's the rub: Edison and PG&E
control 55-60% of the power generation
capacity in the state. This skews the
game from the beginning. Because we
need their power to meet the bulk of the
state's electricity needs, the law of supply and demand dictates that the big utilities can name their price.
Independent suppliers also would bid
into the pool, but only a few-the largest, most financially secure independent
power producers-would come up winners. After this initial shakeout of winners
and losers, the dominant players could
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begin to collude, in effect, on the price
of the pool's power.
Because all the PoolCo players would
be fairly knowledgeable about each other's
costs, capital investment, and financial
strengths or weaknesses, the dominant
bidders could begin to signal each other
through the bidding process. As with the
airlines or the oil cartel, these key players could work together to raise the floor
price, and punish low-bidding newcomers who disrupt their game.
But there is an even larger issue looming on the deregulation horizon. Whichever model is adopted eventually by the
PUC, how consumers fare will largely depend on who is forced to pay for the utilities' high-cost nuclear powerplants and
how much.
The high cost of power from nuclear
plants such as PG&E's Diablo Canyon and
Edison's San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station is the driving force behind California's high rates, which are 50% above
the national average. With power selling at
12 cents per kilowatt hour, Diablo Canyon
and San Onofre would not be players in a
truly competitive market for electricity (although PoolCo would allow them to continue operating). Utilities say ratepayers
should bail utility investors out from under
these behemoths, and regulators have indicated that they will go along with this plan.
If they do, rates will likely stay high no
matter which model of "competition" is
adopted. Utility investors should pay the
price for their past mistakes, not ratepayers. After all, it was the investors who
chose to build plants in the first place.
Likewise, as long as the utilities continue
to own and control the bulk of the state's
electricity generating resources, PoolCo
will fail to lower prices through competition.
Instead of choosing between the two
plans advocated by the utilities-PoolCo
and so-called "direct access," which would
allow consumers to choose their utility
company, the PUC should consider operations that would truly benefit consumers.
Finally, the PUC must ensure that a
deregulated market for electricity is free
from utility domination and benefits all
consumers equally-even if that means
divesting the utilities from the business
of generating electricity.
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